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WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL ANALYSIS
IN THE AGE OF NON-JUDICIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Mark Edwin Burge*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, the American system of legal educa-
tion has predominantly emphasized the role of cases and judge-
made law,' but with the understanding that the craft of the law-
making judge is constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis.2 This
case-oriented approach to teaching law extends to statutes: stu-
dents learn of the role of courts in interpreting and explaining stat-
utes, making judicial construction of statutes part-and-parcel of
statutory law.' Thus, pervading the formative first year of law
school is the assumption that the role of lawyers is principally to
analyze what courts have done in the past in order to predict what
stare decisis-constrained courts will likely do in the future. Even
outside of pure common law, statutory interpretation is principally
a judicial function. This article describes the extent to which these
assumptions are incorrect and suggests steps that we in law teach-
ing should take to adapt our classroom approach accordingly.
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Special thanks to
ALWD, the Association of Legal Writing Directors, for providing the grant that got this project
off the ground. I also thank my colleagues Frank Snyder and Tanya Pierce for improving this
article with their substantial comments on earlier drafts. Feedback following presentations of
this article at the Eighth International Conference on Contracts and at regional and biennial
conferences of the Legal Writing Institute was also help for which I am grateful.
1 See generally Stephen R. Alton, Roll Over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief
History of American Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 340 (2010) (noting that the
case method has dominated American legal education for more than a century).
2 See Charles R. Calleros, Introducing Students to Legislative Process and Statutory Analysis
Through Experiential Learning in A Familiar Context, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 33, 56 n.17 (2003)
("Early in the first semester, students should have at least an acquaintance with the doctrine of
stare decisis, both from their doctrinal course work and especially from their work in a legal
method and writing course."); Patrick Higginbotham, Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adju-
dication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 413 (1988) ("[S]tare decisis ... allows the case method to
evolve doctrine .... [T]he courts obedient to stare decisis have the range, at least within an outer
circle of an earlier case, to push the law, often to push off in a quite different direction from the
first court, without overruling its decision.").
3 Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 321 (2005) (observing that cases interpreting statutes generally receive stronger-than-
normal stare decisis effect in federal courts).
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Two areas best illustrate the growing falsity of these assump-
tions about stare decisis and statutory interpretation that law stu-
dents are taught in their first year of law school. The first such area
is when administrative agencies engage in non-judicial adjudication
of cases and promulgating regulations. The second area is that in
which contracting parties have their disputes determined by an ar-
bitrator instead of a judge. The government agency and private
arbitrator have one thing in common: the broad swath of their in-
terpretations and applications of prior law tends to be unassailable
and will likely be the last word on the matter, even if their actions
are at gross variance with what a court would have been obligated
to do as a matter of law. Our teaching of legal analysis should
better reflect this reality of law practice. In a sense, practitioners
today are likely to appear before some "judge" who will grapple
with fixed statutes but who is not necessarily bound by stare decisis.
Put another way, many cases now should be approached by pru-
dent practitioners as though they are questions of first impression,
even when they are not.
Part II of this article considers the ubiquitous role of stare de-
cisis as an underlying paradigm in the first year of law school, with
a particular focus on the interrelation of that common law doctrine
and statutory interpretation. 4 Next, Part III describes the increas-
ing displacement of stare decisis as a controlling limitation in
American law, most notably in administrative law and arbitration.'
Part IV evaluates the value of the traditional judicial framework
for legal instruction in light of its substantial inaccuracy, concluding
that stare decisis must remain prominent but that changing realities
of law practice require it to play a lesser role.6 Our students must
learn the ability to think outside the stare decisis box while main-
taining the ability to be constrained by it. This article concludes
that the precedent-oriented methodology we typically employ for
teaching legal analysis in first-year courses-especially in the first-
year legal writing course-is, despite being well-meaning and peda-
gogically sound, increasingly dishonest. Stepping away from the
myopic focus on stare decisis and incorporating a more robust con-
cept of non-judicial statutory interpretation into our-first year
courses are ultimately the best remedies for this problem.
4 See infra Part II, text accompanying notes 7-54.
5 See infra Part III, text accompanying notes 55-151.
6 See infra Part IV, text accompanying notes 152-198.
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II. FIRST-YEAR LAW STUDENTS, STARE DECISIS, AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Almost since their inception in American legal education,
Christopher Columbus Langdell's case method and the Socratic di-
alogue that accompanies it as its signature pedagogy have been met
with both praise' and scorn.' The time-worn clich6 for the educa-
tional function of law school-particularly the formative first year
of law school-is that it teaches students to "think like a lawyer."9
Even when law schools have shifted their attention to experiential
learning, practical skills, and subject-area specialization in the up-
per-level curriculum,'o the first year of law school is widely recog-
nized as playing a special role in the transformation of law students
into lawyers. The first year is when the most important program-
ming of the brain occurs. That element of John Jay Osborn's The
Paper Chase remains true to this day."
Nonetheless, both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests
that the terror-inducing side of the Socratic method is much faded
from its prime as memorialized in the form of Osborn's Professor
Kingsfield. Langdell's innovations certainly qualify as among the
7 See Amy M. Colton, Eyes to the Future, Yet Remembering the Past: Reconciling Tradition
with the Future of Legal Education, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 963, 971-72 (1994) (noting that
among the "avid supporters of the case method" was "probably the most respected legal mind of
the day-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.").
8 See W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1997) (recount-
ing how Langdell's approaches to legal education were widely criticized during Langdell's life-
time); William P. Lapiana, Langdell Laughs, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 141, 143 (1999) (observing
that Boston University's law school was founded by disaffected Boston practitioners who found
Langdellian instruction at Harvard insufficient preparation for practice).
9 See, e.g., James Boyd White, Schooling Expectations, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 499 (2004)
(describing "to think like a lawyer" as clich6, but then seeking to explain it); Toni M. Fine, Do
Best Pedagogical Practices in Legal Education Include A Curriculum That Integrates Theory,
Skill, and Doctrine? A Comment on "The Integration of Theory, Doctrine, and Practice in Legal
Education," 1 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORs 66, 67 (2002) (finding thinking like a lawyer
to be "not only clich6 but beg[ing] the question: What do students really need to learn in order
to 'think like a lawyer'?"); John Lande, Teaching Students to Negotiate Like A Lawyer, 39 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 110 (2012) ("Every law professor and law student is familiar with the clich6
that law school teaches students to 'think like a lawyer."').
10 See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 87 (2007) (stating that "developing lawyers must at some point learn
another set of demanding skills" and that those skills are "the introduction to practice.").
11 JOHN JAY OsBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1971); see also Grant H. Morris, Teaching
with Emotion: Enriching the Educational Experience of First-Year Law Students, 47 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 465, 468 (2010) (recounting as a signature moment of the movie adaptation when Profes-
sor Kingsfield informed his first-year contracts class, "You come in here with a skull full of mush,
and you leave thinking like a lawyer.").
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most criticized aspects of legal education. The criticism seems to
have had an impact, whether in professors' move to a loosely-de-
fined "modified Socratic" approach or in their partial abandon-
ment of the case method in favor of the use of problems.1 2 How,
then, are law students still learning to "think like a lawyer" when
the pedagogy most credited with achieving that result is so dimin-
ished from its pure form in Langdell's day?
Despite the modifications in past decades, the fact remains
that the first year of law school is still obsessively case-focused.
While legal education today is delivered more gently than by either
Langdell or Kingsfield, it still seeks the same results. Even with a
much-weakened case method and Socratic drilling, law students
are still learning core principles of analysis that have a dramatic
impact on the way they perceive legal problems. That analysis is
based on cases, and the cases reign supreme because of stare
decisis.
A. The Stare Decisis Foundation
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply
them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer ....
Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow
degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main
13through a series of cases ....
With these words in his landmark A Selection of Cases on the
Law of Contracts, C.C. Langdell articulated the teaching innova-
tion that became the basis for the modern American law school-
the case method. The case method was actually a package of inno-
vations, including the selection and printing of appellate decisions
in a student "casebook" and the Socratic method of student exami-
nation of judicial decisions in the face of questioning by the profes-
12 Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in Literature, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 957 (2005) ("While a majority of law professors continue to use some
form of Socratic questioning, increasing numbers of professors engage in far less aggressive
questioning of their students and adopt an array of techniques to lessen the stress, including
allowing students to pass when they are called on or giving advance notice when they will be
called on in class.").
13 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs vi (1871).
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sor.1 4 From its introduction in 1870, Langdell's approach gained
widespread acceptance and became the dominant method of legal
instruction in the United States." One of the most remarkable
traits of Langdell's success is that it happened despite the fact that
one of his foundational premises has long been widely discredited:
Law is, in fact, not ultimately susceptible to being "considered as a
science. "16
Langdell's method, however, was built on two other and
stronger premises that have more successfully withstood the test of
time. The first of these premises is that the core lawyering function
(i.e., "what constitutes a true lawyer") is to be able to engage in
predictive reasoning. Put another way, a proper lawyer does not
merely know black-letter legal rules as they might be gleaned from
a treatise, but he has the ability to "apply them with constant facil-
ity and certainty."' The truly skilled lawyer can, in Langdell's
view, actually predict legal outcomes-a valuable skill for clients,
indeed.
The second surviving premise of the case method is built on
the first: past cases matter a great deal because they define what
courts will do thereafter. Having studied the developmental
growth of a legal doctrine, "extending in many cases through cen-
turies," lawyers can have a superior understanding of how the doc-
trine might affect a client today. Without using the term, Langdell
is hinging much of the value of his pedagogy on stare decisis.
Courts may develop and elaborate on legal doctrines to deal with
new situations, but they generally will not overturn established le-
gal wisdom.
But how did these two premises-prediction as the core lawy-
ering function and stare decisis as the basis for prediction-fare in
the transition from classical formalism to legal realism? As it hap-
pens, they fared quite well. Oliver Wendell Holmes, oft considered
14 Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517,
518 (1991).
15 Id.
16 LANGDELL, supra note 13; see also Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell's
Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88 N.D. L. REV. 21, 34 (2012) ("In a very short time, the scientific
theory paradigm attributed to Langdell was 'obsolete in entirety."') (quoting Edward Rubin,
What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 635
(2007)); Robin Feldman, Law's Misguided Love Affair with Science, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH.
95, 100 (2009) (describing how, after Langdell, the legal system "stubbornly refused to conform
to any notion of a rational science.").
17 LANGDELL, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
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a "proto-realist"18 who was ahead of his time, did not subscribe to
Langdell's view of law as subject to abstract scientific principles.
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,"
Holmes famously declared.19 So, to Holmes, the law could not
properly be viewed through the lens of a science laboratory in the
same way that Langdell viewed it.2 0 Yet Holmes just as famously
agreed with the Langdellian conception of the core function of
properly-trained lawyer: "The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law." 2 1 The lawyer's core function, once again, is to "prophesy"
legal outcomes. Stare decisis might not fully draw its essence from
science or logic, but it was, despite its occasional illogic, a tool by
means of which lawyers could predict one result as more probable
than the other.
The "true" legal realist era followed Holmes in rejecting law
as laboratory science, but prediction remained the core lawyering
function and stare decisis an indispensable tool in its aid. Karl
Llewellyn's classic 1930 text for entering law students, The Bram-
ble Bush, both affirmed the lawyer's predictive role and continued
Holmes's notion that law functions both in light of stare decisis
past-precedent and in present reality:
It should be clear ... that the work of business counsel is impos-
sible unless the lawyer who attempts it knows not only the rules
of law, knows not only what these rules mean in terms of pre-
dicting what the courts will do, but knows, in addition, the life of
the community, the needs and practices of his client-knows, in
a word, the working situation which he is called upon to shape
18 R. Blake Brown & Bruce A. Kimball, When Holmes Borrowed from Langdell: The "Ultra
Legal" Formalism and Public Policy of Northern Securities (1904), 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 278,
317 (2001) (observing that "[tlraditionally, Holmes was perceived as a proto-Realist and Lang-
dell as the archetypal formalist.").
19 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881); see also id. at 35 ("The
official theory is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents. But ...
precedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for
them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from
the merely logical point of view.").
20 Cf Bruce A. Kimball, Young Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an Edu-
cational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL EDUc. 189, 236 (2002) (recounting "Langdell's famous analo-
gies," supporting his pedagogical methods, including that the law library is "all that the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to
the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.").
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457, 460-61 (1897)
(emphasis added).
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as well as the law with reference to which he is called upon to
shape it.2 2
Decades later, Llewellyn continued to put great weight on the role
of binding precedent, even when his attention turned to drafting
statutes. In explaining Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Llewellyn called Section 2-302 on unconscionability "perhaps the
most valuable section in the entire code" despite the lack of any
attempt to define the term.23 He asserted that the untethered term
would nonetheless add certainty, stability, and predictability to
commercial law because "precedent" would "greatly advance
certainty." 24
In his own introductory text for law students almost twenty
years after Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush, Edward Levi also de-
scribed legal reasoning in part as a rebuttal to the formalists. In-
deed, the formalist era's promise of determinacy was merely a
"pretense" 25 and not truly an accurate depiction of the American
legal system. 26 Nonetheless, Levi still taught that legal reasoning
was bound up in "the doctrine of precedent," that is, stare decisis.2 7
While the law has an "indispensable dynamic quality" of continual
change, that change occurs because new cases present new facts
that further flesh out the meaning of a legal rule.2 8 Precedent still
governs because "the scope of a rule of law, and therefore its
meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be con-
sidered similar" and this fact-to-fact "finding of similarity or differ-
ence is the key step in the legal process." 29 In other words, the fact
that past cases control future cases was not in doubt, for that is the
essence of the doctrine of precedent. The lawyer is still very much
22 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 4 (1930); see
also id. ("And so to my mind the main thing is seeing what officials do, do about disputes, or
about anything else; and seeing that there is a certain regularity in their doing-a regularity
which makes possible prediction of what they and other officials are about to do tomorrow.").
23 See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 97[B][1] (5th ed.
2011) (quoting the Statement of Karl Llewellyn in 1 STATE OF NEW YORK 1954 LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at 57).
24 Id. (quoting the Statement of Karl Llewellyn in 1 STATE OF NEW YORK 1954 LAW REVI-
SION COMMISSION REPORT, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at 113).
25 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) ("It is important
that the mechanism of legal reasoning should not be concealed by its pretense. The pretense is
that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge; the pretense has long been under
attack.") (citing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936)).
26 Id. ("In an important sense, legal rules are never clear, and, if a rule had to be clear before
it could be imposed, society would be impossible.").
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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the predictor of outcomes based on analysis of prior cases; 30 that
predictor simply must account for indeterminacy arising from dif-
fering facts.
American jurisprudence and legal theory certainly did not end
with the overthrow of Langdellian formalists by the legal realists,
but it is appropriate for present purposes to skip directly from the
era of Llewellyn and Levi to the present day. Having dispensed
with Langdell's metaphor of law as science, the realists nonetheless
adopted and maintained, in large part, his case method and its un-
derlying premises: (1) that prediction of legal outcomes is a core
lawyering function, and (2) that the principal means of predicting
such outcomes is through case analysis informed by stare decisis,
albeit with the recognition that stare decisis does not operate with
scientific precision. As to these two principles, I suggest that legal
education still lives very much in the world of the legal realists'
variant on Langdell's case method.
A survey of some current representative first-year texts exem-
plifies the point that legal pedagogy remains very much in the
world of stare decisis. Before providing the excerpts, let me be
clear that I have not singled out these texts for criticism. In fact,
these are excellent books that, in many instances, I myself have
assigned to students and used (I hope) with some measure of peda-
gogical success. I have selected these quotations merely because
they are representative of the current methodology in American
legal education.
Consider first, for example, the following passage from an in-
troductory text on legal analysis that is geared toward law students
in the opening days and weeks of their education:
Imagine a system without stare decisis or precedent. If judges
decided each case without regard to prior cases, litigants would
indeed be at the mercy of the court. Judges would have the
power to reach conclusions without the aid of a sustainable pre-
dictable body of law. Litigants would have no reliable basis to
determine whether a particular act had any culpable conse-
quence. Without stare decisis and precedent, the ability of law-
yers to predict a legal result would be nearly impossible.31
These statements indeed are premised on the surviving case
method principles from Langdell's day: lawyers must predict out-
30 Id. at 7 ("What does the law forum require? It requires the presentation of competing
examples.").
31 DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTr VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMEN-
TAL SKILL 10 (2d ed. 2009).
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comes, and in a common law system their key methodology for
doing so is stare decisis.32
The excerpt below, from an established and respected legal-
writing text, discusses an objective legal memorandum. The pre-
dictive task of a lawyer in writing a memo has already been estab-
lished. Notice, however, that the students' selection of authority is
premised on the constraining force of stare decisis:
When you search for case authorities to help you answer the
issue before you, you will search first for precedents that are
binding on the court where the issue will be decided because
these cases provide the constraints within which you must ana-
lyze the problem.33
A text geared toward international students, many of whom
undoubtedly have come to an American law school from a country
with a civil law system, unsurprisingly also focuses on the role of
binding precedent in an Anglo-American jurisdiction:
Predictability [in the common-law system] is provided by the
concept known as stare decisis: the courts' policy to stand by pre-
cedent (previous decisions) and not to disturb a settled point. In
other words, similar cases must be decided similarly.34
Finally, lest anyone think the brooding presence of stare deci-
sis methodology is confined to legal-writing and legal-methods
courses,3 5  consider an introductory passage from a modern
casebook. Given the previous references to Langdell's contracts
casebook and to a giant of contracts jurisprudence like Llewellyn,
we can appropriately consider the subject of first-year contracts in
the present day:
The study of contract law may begin in several different ways. It
is logical to begin by exploring the myriad questions dealing
with the "agreement process," how a court determines whether a
contract was formed and how it was formed. There are, how-
ever, other desirable points of departure. One of the most im-
32 Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 76 (2009) ("In a
civil law system, courts are generally not bound by prior decisions; they are always free to
change course. In the common law, however, stare decisis binds future courts to reach the same
conclusion as prior courts, furthering the predictability of law.").
33 HELENE S. SHAPO, ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAw 14 (5th ed. 2008).
34 NADIA E. NEDZEL, LEGAL REASONING, RESEARCH, AND WRITING FOR INTERNATIONAL
GRADUATE STUDENTS 4 (2004).
35 See David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the
Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 136-37 (2003) (demonstrating the existence of
a gap between doctrinal courses and legal writing courses in which the writing courses frequently
better teach deductive reasoning from primary authority).
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portant inquiries that must be pursued is, what will the legal
system do for a party where the other party has breached a con-
tract, i.e., what legal remedies are available and how do courts
apply them?36
The point underlying the presentation of doctrine is that courts are
the single most important source of law. As a result, students will
read cases in large part to see what courts do because their past
decisions should guide lawyers' and parties' future actions. Stare
decisis controls legal reasoning even in its diluted form that arises
from the generic "national jurisdiction" of a doctrinal law class-
room.37  The past may not control the present in an absolute
Langdellian scientific sense, but across the first-year law school
curriculum, we teach pervasively that cases control and constrain
the predictions that a competent lawyer can make. Predictions
must be derived from that past, whether that means analogizing to
past authority or distinguishing it.
B. Grafting on Statutory Interpretation
Case law is typically central to legal reasoning in the first year
of law school. Statutory law has, however, assumed a greater role
in recent years, perhaps most prominently in Harvard Law
School's addition of a freestanding "Legislation and Regulation"
course to its first-year curriculum ,38 an innovation that has oc-
curred at my own institution as well. 3 9 Aside from such a stand-
alone course, many professors make a concerted effort to
incorporate statutory analysis into their courses. 40  Although cur-
36 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 10-11 (6th ed. 2006)
(emphasis added).
37 Romantz, supra note 35, at 143 ("Doctrinal courses tend to disregard the primacy of con-
trolling authority in favor of one convenient national jurisdiction.").
38 See generally Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 166, 169 (2008) (describing this aspect of curricular change at Harvard Law
School and advocating its adoption at other law schools).
39 See Texas A&M University School of Law 2013-2014 Catalog 9, 26, available at http://law.
tamu.edu/Portals/0/docs/cnoriega/13%20-14%20Catalogv1_-nonspread.pdf (last visited Aug. 22,
2013) (stating the requirement of a three-credit "Legislation and Regulation" course in the first
semester for full-time law students and describing the course).
40 See, e.g., Richard M. Thomas, Deprofessionalization and the Postmodern State of Adminis-
trative Law Pedagogy, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 96 n.48 (1992) (contending that many law teachers
"give significant attention to statutory and regulatory issues in their first-year legal methods and
legal writing courses" and that such attention "will inevitably increase."); Joshua Dressler, Crim-
inal Law, Moral Theory, and Feminism: Some Reflections on the Subject and on the Fun (and
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ricular laments of the past have included the complaint that Ameri-
can law schools using the case method do not give enough
attention to statutes,4 1 the basis for this particular complaint seems
to be declining.
My concern for present purposes is not whether law schools
teach statutory interpretation (because they do), or even the extent
to which they teach statutory interpretation (because the extent is
increasing). My concern, rather, is for how we predominantly pre-
sent statutes: their interpretation is judicial-centric and a subset of
stare decisis.
Having looked earlier at some first-year texts' explicit and im-
plicit presentation of stare decisis-based prediction as the core
lawyering function, I now consider some treatments of statutes
from that same introductory time period. Once again, I note that
these quotations are from excellent materials, including some that I
or colleagues of mine have used and would use again without hesi-
tation. I offer these quotations precisely because they are typical.
The tying of statutory interpretation to stare decisis in first-
year texts is sometimes quite direct, as in the following excerpt:
Once a court interprets a statute, the principle of stare decisis
applies and the court will then follow the interpretation it or a
higher court has previously adopted unless it overrules it. For
each new case with the same statutory issue, the court then rea-
sons by analogy to the facts of the prior cases in order to apply
the statute to the new case.42
Thus, while the statute might provide the initial black-letter law
with which analysis begins, case law ultimately achieves primacy
for purposes of prediction.
Another example focuses on the particular instance of statu-
tory ambiguity but assumes that courts will fill in the gaps:
[L]egislatures do not really finish the job of legislating. Statutes
have ambiguities, and often we do not know what a statute
means until the courts tell us. . . . Courts record their decisions in
Value) of Courting Controversy, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1143, 1166 (2004) ("Criminal Law might be
the best first-year substantive class for teaching students statutory analysis.").
41 Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-Based Ap-
proach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REv. 285, 342 n.37
(1998) (stating that "[sitatutory interpretation still tends to get overlooked in the first year and in
law school generally" but that the situation is improving).
42 SHAPO, supra note 33, at 112.
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judicial opinions, which establish precedents under the doctrine
of stare decisis.43
Upon reading statements like those above, a student could credibly
ask: if the legislature enacts a statute in the forest and a court was
not present to hear it, does it make a sound?44
In another widely adopted introductory text on legal writing
and legal analysis, the author attributes primacy to judges in deter-
mining the meaning of statutory language: "The ability to interpret
the text and decide whether it applies gives courts broad powers to
define even statutory law." 45  In this instance, the focus is once
again judicially oriented, an unsurprising result under the predomi-
nant case method.
The fact that the above statements and other similar ones are a
point of emphasis in American law schools is unsurprising, consid-
ering the fact that law in the United States has its origins in the
English common law.4 6 How could courts not be front-and-center
for the conversation? "Although much of the [English] common
law has since been changed through [American] statute or judicial
decision," as one leading first-year text describes the situation for
new law students, "it remains the foundation of our legal system.
Common-law methods of reasoning dominate the practice and
study of law."47
The relatively new Legislation and Regulation course now
taught in many law schools might seem, at first blush, an exception
to this approach by putting statutory text front and center. Oddly
enough, this course, which is arguably the antidote to case-
supremacy in the first-year curriculum, actually reinforces the pres-
43 RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, LEGAL REASONING AND LE-
GAL WRITING 20-21 (7th ed. 2013) (emphasis added). This view of statutory meaning is current,
but it also has a long and distinguished pedigree. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Words and Music:
Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1266-67 (1947) (arguing
that statutes are written for judges much the way composers write music for performing musi-
cians-both judges and musicians provide actual realization of the source material).
44 The actual popular philosophical question, of course, is, "If a tree falls in a forest and no
one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?" Eighteenth century philosopher and Anglican
Bishop George Berkeley is credited with raising the dichotomy between physical substance and
its perception. See, e.g., McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979) (presenting the state-
ment as "Bishop Berkeley's famous question"); see also GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CON-
CERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (1710) (1878 reprint available at http://books.
google.com/books?id=nhpLAAAAMAAJ) (arguing that things in the material world exist only
when perceived in the mind).
45 LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 24 (3d ed. 2011).
46 NEUMANN & TISCIONE, supra note 43, at 3-5.
47 Id. at 5.
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entation in all the other courses: the meaning of statutes is prima-
rily derived from what courts say about them.
Consider, for example, the text by Professors Manning and
Stephenson that arose directly out of Harvard Law School's 2006
curricular reform.4 8 The authors state up-front their intention to
"begin by focusing on legislation, considering the methods that fed-
eral courts use to read statutes,"4 9 and then highlight five leading
issues on which students should focus. 50 Sure enough, every one of
those questions revolves around the role and function of courts in
statutory interpretation.5 1 In the book's chapters devoted to stat-
utes, 201 out of 356 pages are occupied in full or in part by tradi-
tional edited cases, predominantly from the United States Supreme
Court. Most of the remaining 356 pages are notes and commentary
on the principal cases. The material is, to be sure, interesting and
worthwhile, but it does absolutely nothing to disabuse law students
of the idea that the most important statutory meaning flows from
the precedential effect of cases. For better or for worse, the Man-
ning and Stephenson text is still a casebook, every bit as much a
typical first-year law student's primary text for Torts, Contracts, or
Property.
The present state of affairs in teaching first-year law school
courses is thus not that statutes are being neglected; rather, it is
that statutes are most often presented-even sometimes exclu-
sively presented-as a graft onto Langdell's case method. tree.
While canons of construction and other tools for constructing the
meaning of statutes are important, the statutes must ultimately give
48 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEVENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2010).
49 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 2-3.
51 The five bulleted issues that Manning and Stephenson highlight are:
* Is the courts' job to figure out precisely what Congress would have wanted in the
circumstances of a given case, or should courts apply statutes according to the plain
import of their terms because the words are what Congress enacted into law?
* Should courts consult the purposes of the statute-the reasons that Congress likely
passed it in the first place-when interpreting the statutes specific provisions? How
can courts figure out what those purposes are?
* Should courts pay attention to what legislators said about the statute during the
process leading up to its enactment? Should they pay special attention to what a
bill's sponsors said they thought it meant? What about the views expressed by the
specialized legislative committees that initially considered and proposed the
legislation?
* Should courts use specialized rules of thumb (in trade lingo, "canons of construc-
tion") to help resolve statutory ambiguities?
* Do we get help with any of these questions [about courts] by considering the way
different techniques fit in with our government traditions?
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way to judicial decision-making. Cases will control statutory mean-
ing because of stare decisis, as later judges will be, in some fashion,
constrained by the interpretations of their predecessors. Research-
ing case law, then, still has primacy for the lawyer fulfilling the core
function of legal prediction.5 2 Or, so we suggest to our students.
The problem with this approach, as I will discuss in Part III,11
is that it is frequently untrue because of the displacement of stare
decisis. Case precedent does not particularly control in major ve-
nues of the actual operation of the law. That is why, in Part IV,54 I
will suggest the need and means for decoupling statutory interpre-
tation from stare decisis while still retaining the strong pedagogical
value inherent in that doctrine.
III. OUTSOURCING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
DowNSIZING STARE DECIsIs
The description during the first year of law school of common
law reasoning and roles of "controlling" cases and statutes has
never been entirely true. Indeed, the charge that legal certainty
was a myth is one of the primary criticisms leveled by legal realists
toward their formalist predecessors,5 5 so the existence of a gap be-
tween pedagogy and practice is hardly a new thing. What is new,
however, is the current size of that gap, as signaled by two deci-
sions of the Supreme Court: National Cable and Telecommunica-
tions Association v. Brand X Internet Services,5 6 an administrative
law case, and Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc. , an ar-
bitration case. These decisions and their progeny require, I sug-
gest, diligent practicing attorneys to consider the abandonment of
common law reasoning in enormous areas of practice because of a
near-total displacement of stare decisis.
52 See generally CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, ET AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 230 (7th
ed. 2008) ("Stare decisis applies in the statutory setting; a court asked to interpret a statute will
follow the interpretation of courts that create the precedents it must follow .. .. Thus, as you
research a statute, you will also research case law interpreting the statute. Otherwise, your re-
search will be incomplete.").
53 See infra Part III, text accompanying notes 55-151.
54 See infra Part IV, text accompanying notes 152-98.
55 Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Free-
dom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 267 (1961) (stating that one of the "chief
aims of the legal realists was to destroy the false certainty" of formalist doctrine, which was "a
certainty grounded on myth.").
56 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
57 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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This shift has an impact on the ways in which law schools
should teach legal analysis during the first year, and particularly
with regard to statutes. The government agency and private arbi-
trator have one thing in common: their interpretation of statutory
law is virtually unassailable and will likely be the last word on the
matter, even if the interpretation is at gross variance with what a
court would do. Our teaching of statutory analysis should reflect a
reality of law practice: much statutory interpretation occurs inde-
pendent of the court system. In a sense, practitioners today are
each a potential "judge," or are at least likely to appear before
someone in the role of "judge" who will grapple with statutes but is
not necessarily bound by stare decisis.
A. Administrative Law
Chief Justice John Marshall famously stated in Marbury v.
Madison that it is "emphatically the province and the duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.""5  Taken from that
starting point, the idea that non-judicial agencies would interpret
statutes is far from intuitive. The New Deal, however, ushered in
an era in which executive branch agencies played an increasingly
large role in stating the meaning of certain statutory law enacted by
Congress, especially those statutes Congress intended to be admin-
istered by agencies. 59 Once the objection was subdued that Con-
gress could not constitutionally delegate broad rulemaking
authority to an administrative agency,6 0 the executive branch began
to "say what the law is" in earnest and with increasing frequency
and specificity. 1
Of course, interpretive rules pronounced by an administrative
agency are just as likely to be the basis for disputes and litigation as
58 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
59 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change,
and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1109 (1988) (describing
how, during and after the New Deal, "Congress was able to sidestep difficult political issues by
delegating broad legislative power to administrative agencies" which then "often were able to
use and expand their legislative power with relatively little apparent scrutiny from the courts.").
60 See generally Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency
Policy Making Under A Necessity-Based Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 286-87 (2011) (describ-
ing the context and creation of the nondelegation doctrine); cf Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
61 Cf Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Pre-
emption Cases, 87 GEo. L.J. 263 (1998) ("The expansion of federal power in the post-New Deal
era has been one of the defining characteristics of twentieth-century American politics.").
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was judicially stated law,62 thereby raising the question of how
much deference the judiciary should give to a statutory interpreta-
tion made by an agency. As it happens, the answer to this question
has an impact on stare decisis and the ability of lawyers to predict
future results based on dominant methods of legal analysis. Not
only is the deference paid by courts to agency interpretation of
statutes high,6 3 but the standard of deference is so constructed as to
minimize the value of otherwise "binding" case law.
Although the roots of modern concerns over agency interpre-
tation stem from the 1930s' New Deal, understanding the current
legal era of statutory interpretation requires looking back only to
1984 and the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.64 A basic understanding of Chevron
and its progeny-especially the 2005 decision by the Court in Na-
tional Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet
Services65-sets the stage for how the growth of the administrative
state and the legal doctrine accompanying that growth have con-
tributed to the diminishing role of stare decisis.
In Chevron, environmental groups challenged the decision by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to modify its regu-
latory definition of the term "stationary source" from a prior defi-
nition that the groups thought more protective of the environment.
Through the Clean Air Act, Congress authorized the EPA to re-
quire obtaining a permit when a facility sought to modify or build a
"stationary source" of pollution, but the term "stationary source"
was not defined by the Act. 6 6 The EPA originally issued a regula-
tion identifying a stationary source as any new or modified equip-
ment that emitted air pollutants-thus, any such installation at an
existing plant would trigger the requirement that the owner seek
and obtain a permit. Environmental permitting is a costly and
time-consuming process that most facility owners wish to avoid. 7
The following year-which not coincidentally included the political
turnover from the Carter Administration to the Reagan Adminis-
tration-the EPA changed course and defined stationary source
62 Cf David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 170-76 (2010) (collecting
empirical studies of certain lawsuits against federal administrative agencies, including those im-
plicating the Chevron doctrine).
63 See id.
64 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'1 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
65 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
66 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
67 Id. at 840 n.2.
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with a "bubble concept" covering an entire facility.6 8 The practical
effect of bundling all facility equipment as a single "stationary
source" was that if the owner of a plant added new polluting equip-
ment but simultaneously offset the new pollutants by reducing
emissions elsewhere at the plant, then the plant owner could avoid
the permitting process.69
The Court held that the EPA could change its regulation.70
The far-reaching impact of Chevron, however, was the two-step
test it laid out for how and when courts must defer to agency inter-
pretations of statutes administered by the agency. Under the first
step, a reviewing court must determine the intent of Congress in
enacting the statute in question. "If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress." 7 2 If, however, a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the issue in question within the agency's interpretation, then the
reviewing court should proceed to step two:
[T]he court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.
Irrelevant to the question is whether the court would have reached
the same interpretive result.74 Exceptional cases notwithstanding,
the agency will win a dispute in step two of the analysis, though the
question of when congressional intent is "clear" in step one has
admittedly been a source of much judicial disagreement.
68 Id. at 840.
69 Id. at 852.
70 Id. at 859.
71 Cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 427 (Peter L. Strauss, ed., 2006) ("Chevron presents a striking
instance of a case that became great not because of the inherent importance of the issue
presented, but because the opinion happened to be written in such a way that key actors in the
legal system later decided to make it a great case.").
72 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
73 Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 843 n.11.
75 See generally Linda D. Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 743-71 (2007) (detailing a decades-long running battle be-
tween supporters of intentionalist and textualist views of Chevron on the Supreme Court); Mark
Edwin Burge, Note, Regulatory Reform and the Chevron Doctrine: Can Congress Force Better
Decisionmaking by Courts and Agencies?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1085, 1096 (1997) (noting that deter-
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One reason Chevron was so far-reaching is that statutory in-
terpretation by administrative agencies has become so pervasive.
Indeed, Thomas Merrill noted in 2006 that at over seven thousand
separate federal case citations, Chevron is easily the most cited
case in administrative law, and he speculated that the decision
might even surpass the reigning most-cited case," that staple of
first-year civil procedure, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins."
So far, so good on the question of methodological predictabil-
ity in the administrative law setting. A lawyer, post-Chevron at
least, in the absence of judicial interpretation would actually gain
highly valuable tools for analyzing and interpreting a statute
through an authoritative interpretation by the agency's administra-
tion of the statute.
But what happens if a court interprets a statute before an ad-
ministering agency does? May a lawyer properly rely on the case
as authoritative, just as she surely learned to do in the first year of
law school? Despite subsequent disagreement by the executive
branch, one could reasonably assume that it is still "emphatically
the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."" Chevron did not necessarily abrogate that judicial
duty but merely circumscribed it, requiring courts not to contradict
an agency that has already reasonably interpreted a statute. In the-
ory, at least, a deferential court and a reasonable agency will not
disagree as to what the law is. A deferential court will not contra-
dict an agency acting permissibly, while a well-behaved agency
would not advance an interpretation contrary to existing judicially
stated law. After all, such an agency would surely not be "reasona-
ble" for Chevron purposes.
Or maybe it would. National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services79 squarely presented this
issue to the Supreme Court and, while the result is not surprising in
light of two decades of Chevron jurisprudence, this case shows how
mining congressional intent under step one based on traditional tools of statutory construction
"depends largely on who gets to choose the tools.").
76 Merrill, supra note 71 at 399 nn.1-2.
77 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For anyone who might enjoy the parlor-game aspect of such matters,
the KeyCite service on Westlaw shows that, as of August 22, 2013, Erie was cited 16,297 times
(federal and state) and Chevron was cited 12,995 times (federal and state) excluding all citations
by secondary sources and practitioner-drafted documents. This performance by the 1984 Chev-
ron opinion is all the more impressive when considering that the 1938 Erie decision had a forty-
six year head start in the race.
7 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
WITHOUT PRECEDENT
fully the traditional relative roles of the executive and the judiciary
can be turned on their respective heads. For present purposes, per-
haps the best way to tell the story of Brand X is through the eyes of
a practicing attorney-one who is faced with the initial facts of the
case yet without knowledge of the final result.
Imagine that you represent a cable company with a problem
involving the meaning of the term "telecommunications service "80
as used in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Your client is
subject to regulations applicable to providers of a statutorily de-
fined "telecommunications service." Your client's specific problem
is one of its competitive positions. The Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") has determined that your client's competi-
tor, a broadband Internet service provider, does not provide a
"telecommunications service" and is thus not bound by the FCC's
mandatory common-carrier regulation.
Fortunately for your client, years before the FCC ruling, the
Ninth Circuit decided that Internet service by a cable modem is
indeed a "telecommunications service" subject to FCC regula-
tions.8 2 At a minimum, then, this is highly persuasive authority in
your favor, especially given that your client's facts are nearly on
"all fours" with the previous case. But even more fortunately, nu-
merous other cable companies have challenged the FCC ruling,
and a judicial lottery has sent the consolidated litigation for resolu-
tion in a district court in the Ninth Circuit. For purposes of your
analysis, that nearly clenches the outcome: stare decisis requires the
Ninth Circuit to follow its prior decision-at least absent compel-
ling reason not to do so-and interpret the phrase "telecommuni-
cations service" as covering your client's competitor.
Your post-research position for meeting with your client is an
enviable one. You bring not only a prediction, but also a predic-
tion your client will like, and your analysis could hardly be on
firmer ground. If an appellate court has already spoken on the is-
sue-and not just any appellate court but your court-that would
be nearly an unquestionable basis on which to make a prediction.
Put another way: to predict otherwise would be tantamount to mal-
practice, right?
80 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2010).
81 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
82 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Wrong. In Brand X, the FCC interpreted the definition of
"telecommunications service"" in the Communications Act of
1934 as subjecting to mandatory common-carrier regulation all
providers of a "telecommunications service." 84 Furthermore, the
FCC had interpreted that statutory term to exclude broadband In-
ternet service, contrary to a prior Ninth Circuit case decided when
the FCC had not issued a definitive interpretation of the term.8 5
Could the later agency interpretation overrule the prior case? Yes,
it could. "Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unam-
biguously forecloses the agency's interpretation," held the Su-
preme Court, "and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill,
displaces a conflicting agency construction."8 6
Brand X has apparently had its intended effect and has led to
similar outcomes elsewhere: courts defer to agency interpretations
of statutes despite prior court precedent to the contrary, and the
agency is free to supersede such precedent.8 7 For example, in 2008,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Tax Court's determi-
nation that the Internal Revenue Service lacked statutory authority
to revise a regulation that had been in place in 1957 and was re-
peatedly construed by that court. Although Brand X deference
does not-like the rest of Chevron deference-apply where an
agency-interpreted statute is unambiguous, ambiguity is frequently
in the eye of the beholding judge. In sum, to whatever extent
Chevron had already undermined the predictive function of law-
yers in the administrative-agency setting, Brand X makes that un-
dermining complete.
The triumph of Chevron deference over stare decisis is rather
expansive, indeed. From the common law tradition mandating ad-
herence to precedent, we find ourselves in a reality where prece-
dent means little. I do not describe this situation to either criticize
or praise it, but merely to point out its existence. In an era in
which substantial and increasing numbers of legal outcomes are in
the hands of administrative agencies, the stare decisis paradigm for
instruction is often a poor fit. Though the lawyer's core function of
prediction does not possess scientific certainty, Brand X illustrates
83 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
84 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 982-83.
87 Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The Deference Co-
nundrum of A Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 18 (2011).
88 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 515 F.3d 162, 168-70 (3d Cir.
2008).
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that predictive possibility of the sort contemplated by the stare de-
cisis doctrine is even further on the wane in a prominent area of
American law.
Nonetheless, perhaps this one area of declining adherence to
precedent is not of great importance. After all, many legal practi-
tioners can and do conduct their professional lives without substan-
tial interaction with administrative law. Maybe the concern, if any,
diminishes in correlation to greater distance from Washington D.C.
Administrative law is only one arena of non-judicial dispute resolu-
tion. The arena that law students are exponentially less likely to be
able to avoid in law practice is contractual arbitration.
B. Arbitration
Arbitration-the contractual and non-judicial resolution of
disputes-has a centuries-long history, 9 but the modern legal land-
scape for arbitration in the United States dates from when Con-
gress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")90 in 1925. In
theory, at least, arbitration is nothing but a non-judicial means of
adjudicating a dispute; arbitrating, rather than litigating, a case is
only a choice of a private, rather than a public, forum. With that
understanding, the private forum is still deciding cases under
largely the same substantive law that a court would apply. And, as
the Supreme Court asserted in 1987, "[t]here is no reason to as-
sume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law." 91
The availability of flexible "rough justice" is a vaunted feature
of arbitration. 9 2 Most, however, of the four decades since 1967
when the greatly expanded use of arbitration occurred enjoyed a
minimal legal backstop: the manifest-disregard doctrine. This doc-
trine held, in effect, that while courts would defer to arbitrators
89 See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American
Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 445 (1984) ("Common law arbitration was sufficiently devel-
oped by the seventeenth century for John March to devote part of a treatise to the subject.").
90 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
91 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987).
92 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitra-
tion, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 46 (1999) (contending under multiple models of arbitration that the
arbitrators "are still likely to temper their awards with the rough justice of equity"); see also
Russ Bleemer, The Calm and the Storm: Arbitration Experts Speak Out on Hall Street Associ-
ates, 26 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG. 104, 107 (2008) ("Parties willingly enter arbitra-
tion knowing that the resulting award will be the product of a mix of law, practicality,
compromise, and rough justice.")
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whose decisions might inadvertently apply the law incorrectly,
awards rendered by arbitrators who ignore the law entirely could
be judicially vacated or modified. The Second Circuit described its
formulation thus:
[T]his court has also recognized that an arbitration award may
be vacated if it is in "manifest disregard of the law." We have
also pointed out, however, that the reach of the doctrine is "se-
verely limited." Indeed, we have cautioned that manifest disre-
gard "clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with
respect to the law." We have further noted that to modify or
vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1)
the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to
apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the
arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case.93
Manifest disregard of the law was difficult to prove, and the doc-
trine was certainly deferential to the arbitration process. Nonethe-
less, it provided at least the assurance that arbitrators must try to
follow the law, even if unsuccessfully. Parties who contracted with
an understanding that applicable law would actually be applied had
a more-than-colorable basis for their understanding.
But manifest-disregard review is effectively a dead letter,
whether one is in state or federal court. Interpretations of the
FAA have, step-by-step, closed down most judicial means of avoid-
ing arbitration awards for legal error. Two cases in particular
closed off most review for legal error in both federal and state
courts, while a third has sealed any remaining cracks by disman-
tling manifest disregard.
First, in the 1967 case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.,9" the Supreme Court held that an arbitration
clause is "separable" from the remainder of the contract containing
it. As a result, a party alleging fraud in the inducement of a con-
tract containing an arbitration agreement cannot have the fraud
claim judicially determined unless that party proved that the arbi-
tration clause itself-as opposed to the entire contract-was the
result of fraud in the inducement. Despite the oft-recited maxim
that the 1925 congressional intent behind the FAA was merely to
"overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agree-
93 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
94 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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ments to arbitrate"9 5 and thus place arbitration agreements "upon
the same footing as other contracts,"9 6 the separability doctrine of
Prima Paint actually placed arbitration clauses in a place of privi-
lege. Arbitration clauses are protected even when an entire con-
tract might have been procured through fraud that did not
specifically involve the boilerplate language of the arbitration
clause.
Second-with the FAA firmly interpreted as "a national pol-
icy favoring arbitration" that "withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims" 9 7-the Su-
preme Court determined in Southland Corp. v. Keating in 1984 that
the FAA applied to state law claims brought in state courts.98
While states could and did have their own laws governing arbitra-
tion after Southland, those statutes faced severe limits in the extent
to which they could vary from the FAA or, indeed, whether they
could be applied at all.99 The Supreme Court in 1989 raised the
possibility that state law could play a robust and different role in
policing the arbitration process, holding in Volt Information Sci-
ences, Inc. that the California choice-of-law provision in a contract
meant that the parties had also agreed to California's law of arbi-
tration instead of the FAA.100
The door cracked open in Volt to variant state arbitration law
was largely forced shut in the 1995 Mastrobuono case.101 In that
case, a securities brokerage contract with a New York choice-of-
law provision arguably incorporated a New York statute forbidding
95 Volt Info Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
474 (1989) (quoting Dean Whitter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)).
96 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
97 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
98 Id. at 16.
99 See Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: Twenty-Five Years in
Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 369 (2010) (stating that Southland has led to "the
mandatory enforcement of the [FAA] in state courts because the FAA does not contain a federal
jurisdictional statement. States are ordered by federal courts to enforce a federal act in state
courts even though that act may be contrary to the public policy of the state."); see also Note, An
Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2250, 2251 (2002) ("Although the Court has placed limits on the FAA's eviction
of state law, some lower courts addressing the problem have subtly expanded those limits, re-
placing state contract and arbitration law with federal 'contract' rules and the FAA.").
100 Volt Info. Servs., 489 U.S. at 479 ("Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by
state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the
[FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward.").
101 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
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arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.'0 2 The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals accepted that argument, substantially on the
basis of Volt, and vacated an arbitral award of punitive damages.10 3
The Supreme Court reinstated the punitive damages award, hold-
ing that the FAA preempted New York law: "[I]f contracting par-
ties agree to include claims for punitive damages within the issues
to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be en-
forced according to its terms even if a rule of state law would oth-
erwise exclude such claims from arbitration."10 4
Together, Prima Paint, Southland, and their progeny created a
place of favor for arbitration in which meaningful review of the
legal substance of arbitral awards by any American court was
barred by the FAA. The result is an odd one, given the contractual
nature of arbitration and the fact that the general law of contracts
is state law, not federal law. 0 s
The third major case that has substantially eliminated judicial
review of erroneous application of the law is Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.10 6 In this 2008 case, the Supreme Court
nearly eliminated a longstanding possible common-law ground for
review of arbitral awards. The parties had agreed mid-litigation to
arbitrate their dispute but expressly provided that the United
States District Court should "vacate, modify or correct any award
. . . where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous."1 0 7
The arbitrator had erroneously interpreted the Oregon Drinking
Water Quality Act as not being an "applicable environmental law"
that would require indemnification under the parties' disputed
commercial lease, and the district court vacated the arbitrator's
award on the basis of this erroneous conclusion of law. 08
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the district court
erred by vacating the award because contracting parties do not
have the right under the FAA to contractually permit broader judi-
cial review than the FAA itself provides. Since the FAA does not
102 Id. at 54-55.
103 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1994), rev'd
514 U.S. 52 (1995).
104 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58 (emphasis in original).
105 See Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and
Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 347 (2010) (observing that "contract law is
state law, so that formally there are fifty different bodies of contract law" but that in substance
the law is "largely uniform among the states.").
106 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
107 Id. at 579.
108 Id. at 580.
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expressly provide for an award to be vacated after the arbitrator
erroneously interprets the law, the parties cannot create such a
right by their contract. 109 If any party invokes the FAA to enforce
an arbitration award, then the grounds for vacating or modifying
that award are limited to those expressly provided in Section 10110
and Section 11111 of the FAA.
The most far-reaching casualty of the Hall Street decision may
have been a matter that was not directly before the Court but was
unavoidably implicated by its reasoning-manifest disregard of the
law as a basis for vacating or modifying an arbitration award. In
the 1953 case of Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court stated that
mere misinterpretations of the law by an arbitrator were not sub-
ject to review by federal courts, but such misinterpretations stood
"in contrast to manifest disregard" of the law,11 2 a far more serious
error that presumably could be reviewed. Following the dicta in
Wilko, the federal courts of appeals determined that "manifest dis-
regard of the law" was a basis for vacating arbitration awards in
cases of extreme legal error that was beyond the grounds specified
in the FAA. 1 13 Though manifest disregard was a backstop of sorts
where it applied, it was not much of one. For example, the Eighth
109 Id. at 592.
110 Section 10(a) authorizes a court to vacate an arbitration award in the following specific
circumstances:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
10 U.S.C § 10(a) (2006).
111 Section 11 authorizes a court to modify an arbitration award in the following specific
circumstances:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
10 U.S.C § 11 (2006).
112 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
113 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v.
MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs.,
Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017
(11th Cir. 1998) (all allowing manifest disregard of the law as a basis to vacate or modify an
arbitration award and cited by the Supreme Court as so holding).
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Circuit standard was that an arbitrator's decision "only manifests
disregard for the law where the arbitrators clearly identify the ap-
plicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore it."1 14 Under
such a version of manifest disregard, failure to follow the law must
be blatant and nearly self-identified by the arbitrator. A few courts
went farther, such as the Fourth Circuit, which held that "manifest
disregard for the law may be found where an arbitrator disregards
or modifies an ambiguous contract term, bases his award on his
own notions of justice, or where an arbitrator failed to hold a hear-
ing in contravention of the parties' contract."115 Nonetheless, by
1999, all eleven numbered circuit courts of appeals and the D.C.
Circuit had adopted some variant of the manifest disregard stan-
dard for vacating arbitration awards. 1 16
Manifest disregard of the law was not directly before the
Court in Hall Street, but the Supreme Court could not avoid dis-
cussing the matter. Petitioner Hall Street used manifest disregard
as its cornerstone proof that the FAA's grounds for vacating an
award under Section 10 (or modifying an award under Section 11)
were non-exclusive and that it could therefore get an award va-
cated on grounds not explicitly stated in the FAA."' As the Court
explained, "if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can
contracting parties."1 1 8 So, having foreclosed review of an arbitra-
tion award under non-FAA grounds, the Court sought in dicta to
explain away its frequently re-quoted language from Wilko.
Maybe the term manifest disregard "merely referred to the [FAA
Section 10] grounds collectively, rather than adding to them."' 1 9 In
any event, the Court ultimately exonerated its use of those words:
"We, when speaking as a Court, have merely taken the Wilko lan-
guage as we found it, without embellishment, and now that its
meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the signifi-
cance that Hall Street urges."120 With that pronouncement, Hall
Street effectively drained any independent meaning from the mani-
fest disregard standard.121
114 Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001).
115 Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006).
116 Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The "Manifest Disregard of the Law"
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 158-59 (2011) (listing cases and years of circuit adoption of the
standard).
117 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 583.
118 Id. at 585
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Dolphin Line, Inc., 50 So. 3d 1050, 1054 (Ala. 2010)
("[I]n Hall Street ... the United States Supreme Court rejected manifest disregard of the law as
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Thanks to Southland and cases expanding upon it, the number
of contracts with arbitration clauses that are not subject to the
FAA is scant. The suggestion in Hall Street that the FAA "is not
the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration
contracts" 1 2 2 is true theoretically, but it is of little practical conse-
quence. A party benefiting from an arbitrator's legal error need
only be careful to seek enforcement under federal law rather than
state law, and must meet the easy threshold showing of a nexus
with interstate commerce. To the extent state law sought to re-
strain arbitration to a field less expansive than that held by the
Supreme Court, state law has been preempted by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA.12 3 As two commentators have
observed about the current state of variance between state and fed-
eral arbitration law, "[s]tates can at most mimic the federal pro-
arbitration standards." 12 4
So why exactly does the expansive scope of the FAA-and its
now compliant state counterparts-matter for purposes of teaching
legal analysis to first-year law students? Justice Black actually an-
swered that question in his 1967 dissent in Prima Paint:
The Court holds what is to me fantastic. . . . [T]he arbitrators
who the Court holds are to adjudicate the legal validity of the
contract need not even be lawyers . . . and even if qualified to
apply the law, not bound to do so. 125
Consider the implications of the last part of that statement. If arbi-
trators are not bound to apply the law in even the grossest sense,
an available ground for reviewing arbitration awards under the FAA."); Citigroup Global Mkts.,
Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) ("In the light of the Supreme Court's clear
language that, under the FAA, the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur,
manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award
must be abandoned and rejected. Indeed, the term itself, as a term of legal art, is no longer
useful in actions to vacate arbitration awards. Hall Street made it plain that the statutory lan-
guage means what it says: 'courts must [confirm the award] unless the award is vacated, modi-
fied, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title,' 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added),
and there's nothing malleable about 'must,' Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585. Thus from this point
forward, arbitration awards under the FAA may be vacated only for reasons provided in § 10.");
but see Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361, 388 (2010) (raising the possibility that the
manifest-disregard standard might still survive in a much-diminished form).
122 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 588.
123 See Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 177 (2002) ("In this [preemptive] core, the validity of
arbitration agreements and matters that can be arbitrated are beyond state regulation.").
124 Id.
125 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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then stare decisis-based analysis in that setting can be forced to the
margins, a mere rhetorical nicety with no actual teeth, more of a
policy argument than anything else. Past decisions have lost their
predictive benefits. Prior cases might matter, but the law does not
place any backstop requiring that they do so.
Yet one fairly could ask whether Justice Black's position was
overwrought. Arbitration certainly has its defenders who insist
that the process is fundamentally fair and that the quality of dis-
pute resolution is as good as or better than what happens in the
American court system.12 6 Others have suggested, despite an in-
creasingly losing battle, that arbitration is inappropriate in settings
where contracting parties have great disparities in bargaining
power, such as in employment law and consumer law.12 7  Argu-
ments over the costs and benefits of arbitration are beyond the
scope of this article. Here, I mean to focus on dealing with what
the situation for contractual arbitration is rather than argue over
what it should be. In fact, the current prevalence of arbitration
combined with the federalized deference to the process means that
law students are increasingly being sent out into a world that is
structurally far different than that for which law school prepared
them.
126 See, e.g., Paul B. Marrow, Determining If Mandatory Arbitration Is "Fair": Asymmetrically
Held Information and the Role of Mandatory Arbitration in Modulating Uninsurable Contract
Risks, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 187, 189 (2010) (stating that mandatory arbitration "affords a
flexible, efficient, timely, and cost effective method for dispute resolution and assists businesses
competing in uncertain markets"); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's
Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORm 783, 811 (2008) (concluding that "employees
subject to mandatory arbitration not only have access to relief that otherwise would seldom be
available; the system works for them"); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical
Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777, 824 (2003) (asserting that "employment arbitration offers
affordable, substantial, measurable due process to employees arbitrating pursuant to mandatory
arbitration agreements and to middle- and lower-income employees."); Lee Goldman, Contrac-
tually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2003) ("Arbitra-
tion . . . is increasingly popular because it allows the parties to avoid court litigation and
structure dispute resolution in a manner that best suits each party's needs.").
127 See, e.g., Craig Smith & Eric V. Moy6, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 301
(2012) (contending that the FAA has become "a hammer for the strong and powerful" and that
Congress needs to revisit the act); but see Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical
Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1051, 1079
(2009) (contending that accusations of systematic arbitration unfairness to consumers have been
exaggerated and remain unproven); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Ad-
vantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 470
(2000) (arguing that "[w]hatever advantage mandatory arbitration may have provided employers
has been lost over the last several years" and that large employers actually fare better in court.).
WITHOUT PRECEDENT
At a fundamental level, law schools are sending their students
out not just ill-prepared for the world that faces them, but actually
actively misinformed about it. How so? A set of New Jersey cases
illustrates a state-law arbitration framework that effectively aban-
doned the notion of manifest disregard even before the push from
the Supreme Court in Hall Street. Next, a set of Alabama cases
likewise shows the effect of Hall Street on the jurisdictions that had
adopted manifest disregard of the law.
In Perini Corporation v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., the
New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed a $14.5 million arbitration
award in favor of a casino owner for lost profits against the general
contractor hired to manage renovation of the casino. 1 2 8 The court,
however, evaluated the legal decisions by the panel of arbitrators
by a standard that allowed for "mere mistakes of law" yet requiring
their interpretation of the law to be "reasonably debatable." 1 2 9
Thus, vacating the award would require "that the arbitrators must
have clearly intended to decide according to the law, must have
clearly mistaken the legal rule, and that mistake must appear on
the face of the award.""'o Even further, the arbitrator's legal error
"must result in a failure of intent or be so gross as to suggest fraud
or misconduct."' The Perini court confirmed the arbitral award,
but did so only after carefully considering whether the award rea-
sonably fell within state contract law principles such as the stan-
dard and timing for computation of lost profits-rather an
important proposition in a $14.5 million case-and the doctrine of
substantial performance.13 2
The exercise drew a rebuke from the Chief Justice who, in his
concurrence, viewed the entire analysis as misguided and substan-
tially defeating the purposes of arbitration. Indeed, Chief Justice
Wilentz was adamant that the legal correctness of the decision
should be of no moment to the court:
For all we know, the arbitrators concluded that the sun rises in
the west, the earth is flat, and damages have nothing to do with
the intentions of the parties or the foreseeability of the conse-
quences of a breach.13 1
128 Perini Corp. v. Greate Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 367-69 (N.J. 1992) (plurality
opinion).
129 Id. at 371.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 373-79.
133 Id. at 392 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
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The statement smacks of hyperbole, certainly. If indeed it were
guidance regarding the potential outcome of a breach-of-contract
case under New Jersey law where the contract contains an arbitra-
tion clause, one might wonder what such a standard does for pre-
dictive analysis. Can a non-malpractice committing lawyer truly
predict to her client that the sun will probably rise in the west?
Of course, the opinion is a concurrence, so perhaps the rough
edges of Wilentz's statement could not possibly reflect actual law.
But think again. A mere two years after Perini, the New Jersey
court reversed course in Tretina Printing and explicitly "adopt[ed]
as a rule governing judicial review of private contract arbitration
awards the standard set forth in the Chief Justice's concurring
opinion in Perini."'3 4 On second thought, maybe that attorney pre-
dicting that the sun will rise in the west was not risking malpractice
at all.13 5 Still, the Perini concurrence's comfort with New Jersey
law not being applied may have derived from the absence of a
choice-of-law provision in the contract at issue: "[I]f nothing is said
in the agreement, the arbitrators may use any standards they want
to reach a just and equitable result, unrestricted by any law or
laws."13 6 The Chief Justice assumed that if parties want New Jersey
law to apply and their award to be reviewed for gross errors of
New Jersey law, then they can and must "say so in their agree-
ment." Query, however, whether contracting parties actually have
that ability following the disavowal of expanded judicial review of
arbitration awards in Hall Street.
The Perini standard does not stand alone, even though most
courts might not describe the judicial deference so vividly. A col-
lection of Alabama cases effectively illustrates the impact of Per-
ini-style deference on legal doctrine. In a 2004 decision, the
Alabama Supreme Court largely deferred to arbitrators and largely
upheld a multi-million dollar arbitration award against the Bir-
mingham News Company in favor of franchise dealers that Bir-
mingham News systematically eliminated from its newspaper
distribution process.137 Birmingham News is notable, however, in
two respects. First, the court decided, after considerable evalua-
tion, to adopt manifest disregard of the law as a basis for vacating
134 Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 640 A.2d 788, 789 (N.J. 1994).
135 Cf Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel,
Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEv. L.J. 271, 280 (2007) (noting that "while many do, commercial arbi-
trators generally are not required to apply the law in rendering their decision.").
136 Perini Corp., 610 A.2d at 397 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
137 Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 30 (Ala. 2004).
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or modifying an arbitration award.'13  It found particularly persua-
sive the fact that every single federal circuit court had done like-
wise, and it went so far as to catalogue the cases. 13 9 Second, the
court laid out a policy rationale for the manifest disregard rule that
gave great deference to arbitrators yet still justified a party's stare
decisis-based reliance on the law.
In the face of seven listed challenges by Birmingham News to
the award based on manifest disregard, the Birmingham News
court found only one error worthy of modification. The panel had
awarded each of the plaintiffs separate categories of compensation
for both "loss of franchise value" and "loss of future profits." 14 0
But, "Alabama law is clear" that an injured party may not recover
duplicative damages for a single wrong and "[b]oth good will and
future profits are computed into lost business value" making the
award of both categories "impermissibly duplicitous." 14 1 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court ultimately rendered judgment in the amount
of the arbitrators' award, less the duplicative compensatory dam-
ages and a concomitant reduction in the punitive damages, as those
had been based on a multiplier of 2.5 applied to the total compen-
satory damages.14 2
The Birmingham News court's policy reasoning supporting the
existence of manifest disregard review is especially persuasive for
present purposes. It was deferential to arbitrators and respectful of
the arbitration process while still requiring a showing of ostensible
adherence to the law:
Carte blanche judicial approval of decisions rendered by arbitra-
tors not shown to have been guilty of fraud, partiality, or corrup-
tion and not made "in excess of the arbitrator's powers," but
that egregiously and manifestly depart from clearly established
law of which the arbitrators were patently aware, would serve
only to undermine the public's confidence in the arbitration
process.143
138 Id. at 52.
139 Id. at 48-49.
140 Id.at 62 (quoting from the arbitrators' award).
141 Id. at 62, 64.
142 Id. at 69.
143 Birmingham News, 901 So. 2d at 49 (quoting Saturn Constr. Co. v. Premiere Roofing Co.,
680 A.2d 1274, 1281 (Conn. 1996)); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disre-
gard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 248 (2007) (arguing that an award that manifestly disregards a mandatory
rule of law should be vacated "because court enforcement of such an award would threaten 'the
integrity of the courts as an institution."') (quoting Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants?
The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINos L.J. 1199, 1206
(2000).).
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And a showing of manifest disregard would not be easy to establish
under Alabama's version of manifest disregard review:
To avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award, a party
"must show that a governing legal principle is well defined, ex-
plicit, and clearly applicable to the case, and . . . the arbitrator
ignored it after it was brought to the arbitrator's attention in a
way that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling
nature."1 44
In other words, judicial review of arbitral determinations of ques-
tions of law needs to exist in some minimal form, at least as a back-
stop against error. Minimal judicial review would not necessarily
prevent the law being applied wrongly, but it would protect against
the law not being applied at all.14 5
Juxtapose this minimal-but meaningful-review of the pro-
cess with the Perini concurrence, which would overlook the fact
that "the arbitrators concluded that the sun rises in the west, the
earth is flat, and damages have nothing to do with the intentions of
the parties or the foreseeability of the consequences of the
breach."' 4 6 Under Birmingham News, an Alabama contracting
party could still rely on the clear and widely established prohibition
against double recovery, while a New Jersey contracting party
under Tretina Printing should have no expectation regarding appli-
cation of the governing law of damages.
Today, however, American lawyers and future lawyers live
under the arbitration law of Hall Street, which gives us the uncer-
tainty of the Perini concurrence ("the sun rises in the west") but
without the saving grace assumed by that concurrence-an ability
to enforceably contract for substantive law to apply to their arbi-
tration. Alabama cases after Birmingham News illustrate that the
post-Hall Street disavowing of manifest disregard of law is both
deep and wide in its impact. In the 2009 case Hereford v. D.R.
Horton, Inc., a family claimed a breach of a limited warranty
against a homebuilder for failure to repair leak damage. 4 7 The
arbitrator ultimately entered (in the court's words) a "summary
judgment" in favor of the builder that the family sought to va-
144 Birmingham News, 901 So. 2d at 51 (quoting GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75,
81 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145 Accord Drahozal, supra note 143 at 247 ("Without manifest disregard of the law as a
ground for vacating an award, courts may be faced with the prospect of having to enforce an
arbitration award where the award on its face openly refuses to follow established law.").
146 Perini Corp. v. Greate Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 392 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).
147 Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 375, 377-78 (Ala. 2009).
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cate. 1 4 8 An award based on an arbitrator's use of a summary judg-
ment process would seem to involve a question of law and an easily
defined record for review. Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme
Court declined to consider the family's claim premised on manifest
disregard, determining that the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hall Street compelled it to overrule Birmingham News
and affirm the award under the FAA without further review.1 4 9 A
year later, the court reached the same decision in a case under the
Alabama Arbitration Act, which the court necessarily interpreted
to conform to the FAA on this matter.so Manifest disregard of the
law as a basis for reviewing arbitration awards is effectively dead
and gone.
Although I could question the wisdom of a standard where
gross, but non-fraudulent, legal error is irrelevant to enforcement
of the law, my present purpose is not to attack the standard. Con-
sider, instead, if in discussing the importance of legal research with
first-year students we were to state: "What is legal research and
why do you need to know about it? Researching the law means
finding the rules that govern conduct in our society.""s' Should we
put an asterisk by that statement? Perhaps we need to note that
significant rules-like the entire doctrine taught in a first-year con-
tracts course-may not "govern" in the literal sense of that word if
a contract contains an arbitration clause. For the moment, my goal
here is to point out this state of affairs and observe that it is a real
and increasingly prevalent problem for a lawyer advising a client.
Traditional law school instruction in legal analysis does not account
for this problem. But it should.
IV. MOVING AWAY FROM THE JUDICIAL PARADIGM
While law schools have expanded their commitment to teach-
ing in areas touching on administrative law and arbitration in re-
cent years (the latter often under the broader umbrella of dispute
resolution), the doctrinal training in both fields does not necessa-
rily integrate skills with the doctrine. To be sure, many current ef-
forts and admonitions regarding curricular reform advocate an
148 Id. at 378.
149 Id. at 380-81.
150 See Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. Dolphin Line, Inc. 50 So. 3d 1050, 1054-55 (Ala. 2010).
151 AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TooLS AND STRATEGIES 1 (5th ed. 2012) (em-
phasis added).
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increased role for skills training in the curriculum. 1 52 This training,
however, is still premised on the overarching existence of a stare
decisis doctrinal paradigm for law practice. What is missing, I
contend, is an explicit and fully explained departure from the judi-
cial paradigm.
In this section, I first recognize the value of the judicial para-
digm to law school pedagogy in establishing an anchor that forces
law students out of the free-wheeling, open-ended analysis with
which they likely arrive at law school. The clich6 that law school is
above all else teaching its students to "think like a lawyer" is per-
sistent because it is true. Lawyers evaluate problems differently
than non-lawyers and that fact is a fundamental part of the value
added by lawyers to problem solving (and, to many, is also the
principal transactional cost added by lawyers). The stare decisis-
based pedagogy of problem solving has too great a benefit to aban-
don it even in the face of its growing variance with actual law
practice.
Having recognized the value of the stare decisis instructional
paradigm, I next consider how to deal with the fact that our teach-
ing frequently does not accurately present the methodology of law
practice where stare decisis may not play a role. Thus, rather than
abandon entirely such a valuable tool, I instead advocate scaling
back the prominence of stare decisis in teaching legal analysis while
filling the pedagogical gap with a more prominent placement of
statutory interpretation in non-judicial settings. Though this pro-
posal has pitfalls, it offers some discrete benefits for the future law-
yers roaming the halls of law schools. I conclude this section by
offering some concrete suggestions for ways to implement this in-
tentional move away from stare decisis without losing the distinc-
tive benefits of current pedagogy.
152 The most notable documents for the most recent law-school curricular reform movement
tend to be WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAW (2007), often simply referred to as the "Carnegie Report," and Roy STUCKEY
AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007),
often simply referred to as the "Best Practices" report.
153 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 152, at 195 (asserting that "the teaching of legal
doctrine needs to become fully integrated into the curriculum" as "part of learning to think like
a lawyer in practice settings"); STUCKEY, ET AL., supra note 152, at 73-74 (finding that a pro-
gram of legal instruction should cover core knowledge of the law, which includes "jurisdiction,
authority, and procedures of the legal institutions and the professions that initiate, develop, in-
terpret, and apply the law of relevant jurisdictions, including knowledge of constitutional law
and judicial review.").
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A. Lies and the Well-Meaning Liars Who Tell Them
I am a liar. Nonetheless, I comfort myself with the fact that I
share this trait with many effective and talented law teachers. The
term liar may be more provocative than necessary, but it truly is
not meant as an insult. The lies to which I am referring are unin-
tentional lies of omission. And we liars have particularly good in-
tentions-we desperately want to teach our students how to
analyze a legal problem, whether in an objective memorandum, a
persuasive brief, or an examination essay.
Consider why-after so many years and so many rounds of
criticism-American law schools, especially in their first-year cur-
riculum, are wedded to Langdell's fundamentally judicial-centric
approach to teaching what the law is.154 Yes, we teach about the
existence and the importance of statutes and regulations at a
greater level of prominence than ever before, but even our stu-
dents' understanding of statutes is dominated by some degree of
stare decisis. Understanding what a statute means-we imply or
directly state-requires seeing how a court has interpreted it.155
Our students legitimately could believe that a statute without judi-
cial interpretation is like the proverbial tree that fell in the forest
with no one present."5 Neither one actually makes a sound.
If stare decisis has substantially diminished as an organiza-
tional principle, then why is American legal education so insistent,
even to the point of misrepresentation, on building the first-year
curriculum around it? The answer is nothing more sinister than
this: it works and it works fairly well.
Law school, unlike other professional or graduate programs,
does not have anything resembling a standard undergraduate pre-
154 See Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Times They Are A Changin': A New Jurisprudence for Social
Security, 29 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 515, 571 (2009) ("Until 1890, no other U.S.
law school used this method, which is now standard. Moreover, the standard first-year curricu-
lum at all American law schools-Contracts, Property, Torts, Criminal Law, and Civil Proce-
dure-stands, mostly unchanged, from the curriculum Langdell instituted."); Kate Nace Day &
Russell G. Murphy, "Just Trying to Be Human in This Place": Storytelling and Film in the First-
Year Law School Classroom, 39 STETSON L. REV. 247, 249 (2009) (noting that despite changes in
technology, the traditional law school curriculum has remained "sacrosanct," and the traditional
law school pedagogy has remained "largely unchanged"); Jeffrey E. Lewis, "Advanced" Legal
Education in the Twenty-First Century: A Prediction of Change, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 655, 657
(2000) (stating that, despite some innovations, "the structure of the J.D. curriculum has re-
mained largely unchanged" for decades).
155 See infra Part 1I.B, text accompanying notes 38-54.
156 See EDWARDS, supra note 45.
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paratory program.'5 7 While this void might be a weakness in some
respects, it is also a strength. People of diverse educational exper-
iences-whether in language, literature, social sciences, hard sci-
ences, business, or engineering-and of diverse life experiences-
whether new graduates, mid-career professionals, or retirees-can
add legal training to their skill set and intellectual experiences. Be-
cause the law school curriculum does not assume any background
beyond an undergraduate degree,ss it must meet and mold stu-
dents precisely where they are with their biases and thinking
habits.
One consequence of this breadth of credentials and experi-
ence is that much of the first year of law school is spent on disabus-
ing students of the notion that their unsupported opinions have
great value. Moreover, support for an opinion that has at least a
logical or ethical basis behind it may still not be legal in nature.15 9
That is to say, the support may not be of a type that people versed
in and carrying out the legal process would recognize as carrying
weight.
Enter stare decisis. It forces legal logic by anchoring the stu-
dents' thought processes so they can become proficient in legal
analysis. In precedent's weaker form, such as what underlies tradi-
tional courses in Torts, Contracts, and Property, the authority may
well be a vague national jurisdiction consisting of the "correct" or
even the "majority approach" from the casebook. Courses like
Civil Procedure and Legal Writing push the development or rea-
soning through use of the strong form of precedent.16 0 Federal
court cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
157 Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What Is the Purpose of Law
School?, 53 J. LEGAL Enuc. 48, 74 (2003) (observing that medical schools in the United States
require a specific premed curriculum but that "[tlhere is no comparable requirement for law
students."); see also Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional
Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 474 (1996) ("[Tloday,
law students study social sciences, such as psychology, medicine, economics, and business and
financial subjects. Thus, students come to law school having acquired a far more specialized
realm of scholarship and are likely to be unfamiliar with the context and assumptions made by
the Langdellian method.").
158 See Steven B. Dow, Rethinking Legal Research: Preparing Law Students for Using Empiri-
cal Data, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 523, 537 (2011) (observing that because there is "no prescribed
set of courses, set of skills, or knowledge for beginning law study" that "skills in statistics and
empirical research methods are randomly scattered among the law student body and most likely
at the introductory level.").
159 See SULLIVAN ET AL. supra note 152 ("Case teaching may be powerful pedagogy because
it distills into a method the distinctive intellectual formation of professionals.").
160 Accord Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1360 n.175
(2010) ("The need to respect stare decisis is especially strong in cases where the precedent is
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Title 28 of the United States Code certainly will control in federal
civil litigation. Legal analysis must reach an even finer point in the
required first-year Legal Writing course.1 61 There, the student
must ultimately discover that not all primary sources are created
equal.162 Even a nominally statutory assignment in a first-year le-
gal writing course will often hinge more on judicial interpretations
of statutes than on interpretive analysis of the statutes them-
selves. 63 Only cases within the jurisdiction of the problem are con-
trolling, and within those, higher court and more recent opinions
tend to mean more than those from lower courts and older cases.
And within each circle of controlling or persuasive authority, nar-
rower factual analogies will tend to carry more weight than more
distant factual analogies. Indeed, the common law and precedent-
oriented approach of American legal education has, by most mea-
sures, been a tremendous success, and not the least of the reasons
for this success is the extent to which it attunes future lawyers to
skillful grappling with actual facts in solving legal problems. 6 4
Students thus learn in their first year of law school, perhaps
above all other things, a framework that in the quest for law school
success ultimately forces them into thinking like lawyers. The judi-
cial-centric instruction built on stare decisis has tremendous peda-
gogical value, 6 5 including the enablement of students to grasp and
internalize the qualitative differences between a legal argument
and a non-legal argument. It sets boundaries for problem solving
based on the interpretation of sub-constitutional law such as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
161 See Romantz, supra note 35, at 146 n.203 (2003) (observing that legal writing's constant
concern with authority and precedent "separates it from other types of composition.").
162 See, e.g., Carrie W. Teitcher, Rebooting the Approach to Teaching Research: Embracing
the Computer Age, 99 LAw LIaR. J. 555, 567 (2007) (describing a comparative study in which, left
to their own choices, "all writing professors began teaching research by discussing the hierarchy
of authority, primary and secondary sources, binding and persuasive authority, and when and
how to use secondary sources.").
163 Accord SHAPO, supra note 33, at 28 ("Cases that interpret and apply statutes are case law
and become precedents in that jurisdiction."); STEVEN M. BARKAN, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 135 (9th ed. 2009) (noting the value of annotated codes for legal research
because "the meaning of a statute passed by a legislative body is not always clear, and a court
must frequently interpret the language used in the statute.").
164 Cf JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 325 (1949) (criticizing legal education for failing to
properly recognize that trial lawyers need skill in inducing trial courts to adopt their version of
the facts before focusing on legal rules.).
165 Cf McDonnell, supra note 41, at 342 n.36 (collecting arguments advanced in favor of the
case method and Socratic instruction, including that "it is a superior way to introduce students to
the law and to develop critical analysis skills," and that it develops "mental toughness and the
ability to think on one's feet"); see also Weaver, supra note 14, at 552-53.
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and requires that students operate within those boundaries. While
stare decisis has never been as much of a source of determinative
certainty as students might think in their first year of law school,
the methodology enables a sharpening of analytical skills by nar-
rowing the field for what is legally possible. Yes, much of the hype
of stare decisis is untrue, but not all of it is. Stare decisis based case
analysis thus is a valuable anchor for the students' developing legal
reasoning. And it is an exceptionally useful tool. My suggestions in
this section thus focus merely on downsizing the role of stare deci-
sis to better reflect the reality of law practice.
B. Equipping Lawyers for Determinacy and Indeterminacy
A predominant challenge for the American law school curric-
ulum is to meet the pedagogical goal of equipping law students to
deal with varying degrees of determinacy and indeterminacy.
These future lawyers must deal with relative determinacy in the
stereotypical setting of trial court litigation, but they must also rec-
ognize the potential indeterminacy inherent in re-analyzing estab-
lished law as a question of first impression. Ironically, what law
students need in this age of non-judicial dispute resolution is the
mindset of a judge. They must be able to approach legal problems
in contexts-such as in arbitration and administrative law-where
no real judge may ever touch the case. 16 6 Without stare decisis,
every legal question is arguably a question of first impression and
the practitioner needs the concomitant ability to think like a high
court judge at even the lowest levels of a legal conflict.
But to the extent stare decisis is not used, it must at least be
explained away. In legal education, the central role of stare decisis
in its weak form (the imagined national jurisdiction of traditional
doctrinal courses) and in its strong form (particularly in first-year
legal writing courses) is much too pedagogically useful to abandon.
The ability to closely analogize and distinguish facts is essential to
law students of diverse backgrounds as they develop a conscious-
ness of what constitutes a legal argument, as opposed to an argu-
ment that merely sounds good. That insight and that ability to
critically analyze facts is, as much as anything else, what people
mean by the euphemism of "thinking like a lawyer." Indeed, these
166 See Leib, supra note 38, at 170 (noting the disadvantages of a litigation-focused curriculum
for "the many law school graduates who will ultimately be engaged in largely administrative,
political, regulatory, ADR-oriented, or transactional work in their professional lives.").
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skills are part of the reason American law school training is a value
adding proposition for the international students who seek it and
also for the enterprises outside the United States who seek to en-
gage or employee American-trained lawyers.
Given this situation of having oversold stare decisis for instru-
mental reasons, what can professors who are teaching legal analysis
to first-year law students do to better equip them? My suggestions
are three. Since these suggestions are each progressively more dif-
ficult to implement, I propose that those teaching first-year law stu-
dents get as far down the list as possible.
1. Sound a Warning
The first change to implement-even in the absence of the
other two-is the incorporation of intentional and explicit class-
room discussion on the issue of the diminished practical utility of
stare decisis. Clear addressing of the topic is appropriate in all ex-
isting first-year courses, but most particularly those involving legal
writing and analysis. And, yes, that means even the overloaded
semester to which your mind just turned. The opportunity to be
heard and have an impact during the first year is too great and it
will not be repeated again.
The first year of law school is a formative experience in which
almost everything is new, and the students have begun actively
building a professional identity.16 7 And while the first year of law
school does not stand alone, it does stand out. The first year cre-
ates a complete heightened awareness for students that arises, in
part, from consistently facing the unknown. Law students in the
first year are building a context from which to understand both the
remainder of their law school experience and their own place in the
profession.16 8  The later years simply do not create the same
heightened sense of awareness because so much context has al-
ready been set. By the third year, the formerly heightened sense
has been replaced by a cognitive filter of "been there, done
that. "169
167 See SULLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 10, at 129 (stating that "law schools shape the minds and
hearts of their graduates in enduring ways" that are "especially salient in the development of
professional purpose and identity.").
168 See STUCKEY, supra note 152, at 276 (finding that the goals of the first year of law school
should "include beginning the process of helping students develop their legal problem-solving
experience, self-efficacy, and self-reflection and lifelong learning skills.").
169 Cassandra M.S. Florio & Steven J. Hoffman, Student Perspectives on Legal Education: A
Longitudinal Empirical Evaluation, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 168 (2012) (suggesting based upon
2009 data that "first-year students are intensely engaged in their education but that by third year
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Since the first year is so critical to setting context, that is where
a discussion of analysis in a non-judicial setting should occur, prob-
ably in the second semester after some introduction to persuasive
writing. After our students have a developed a competency in stare
decisis based legal analysis, we need to discuss the circumstances
where it does not necessarily apply. They must be prepared for the
situation where, on a very basic level, law does not operate in the
way they expect. Put another way, the students need to be warned
that there are settings where stare decisis is, at best, a persuasive
argument: do not relax your advocacy merely because you have
found the law to be strongly on your side, as that may not be
enough.
Although both administrative law and contractual arbitration
are possible vehicles for this discussion, arbitration is probably the
more accessible point of entry in the Legal Writing and Analysis
course. Students are likely already familiar with the concept of ar-
bitration clauses through their Contracts course. Arbitration
clauses have, since at least the Seventh Circuit's seminal (and
much-criticized) decision in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.'70 become
quite prominent in Contracts courses.171 They have proved to be
rich topical fodder for students to grapple with current issues of
how contract formation occurs and the role that mutual assent
plays (or does not play) in that process. Arbitration may also get a
nod in the first-year Civil Procedure course as part of an introduc-
tory discussion of non-judicial dispute resolution, which would also
encompass negotiation and mediation.17 2
Although we can do more and should aspire to do more than
mere identification of increasing limits on the presence of stare de-
cisis in legal analysis, flagging the concern is better than ignoring it
or putting it off until another-probably unknown and unspeci-
they are relatively disengaged"); James Backman, Externships and New Lawyer Mentoring: The
Practicing Lawyer's Role in Educating New Lawyers, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 65, 72 (2009) (sug-
gesting based on 2006 data that "courses and externships are an antidote to the boredom and
endemic lack of preparation reported regularly during the final year of law school.").
170 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
171 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 216-23
(6th ed. 2001); ROBERT E. ScoTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 268-76 (4th
ed. 2007); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT
24-37 (2d ed. 2006) (all using Hill to teach a variety of aspects of contract doctrine).
172 See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES,
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 842-52 (6th ed. 2012); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 626-48 (Compact 10th ed. 2010); RICHARD L. MARCUS, ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 491-503 (5th ed. 2009); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 475-513 (6th ed. 2004) (all discussing non-judicial dispute resolution).
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fied-upper-level course. If you, as a professor teaching legal anal-
ysis-whether in a skills course or in a doctrinal course 1 7 3-are
unsure of what else to do with relating the downsizing of stare deci-
sis to your students, at least talk about it. Sound a warning while
they are most keenly listening.174
2. Change the Classroom Language
The first recommendation is the easiest to implement because
it involves only one point in time to initiate a discussion of stare
decisis in decline. This second proposal is more difficult in the
sense that it requires implementing a persistent change throughout
the Legal Writing and Legal Analysis course (and arguably in doc-
trinal courses too) throughout the entire first year. Just as stare
decisis has been downsized in actual law practice, we should also
downsize it in our courses. But how? The great pedagogical value
of stare decisis cautions against removing it from a place of primacy
in teaching legal analysis, so the need is for a means of reducing the
general pervasiveness of precedent even while it dominates actual
classroom activity. One way to accomplish this challenging balanc-
ing act-keeping stare decisis prominent yet not wholly perva-
sive-is by changing our language in the classroom.
Elizabeth Mertz, a sociolinguist and law professor at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, conducted a linguistic study of the use of lan-
guage through recordings of first-year Contracts classes at eight
different law schools.' The fit between language and law is
stronger than between language and most other disciplines be-
cause, as Mertz notes early on, it is "through language that social
problems are translated into legal issues."17 6 The extensive study
resulted in seven central conclusions, 7 but for my present limited
purposes I wish to draw only upon Mertz's second conclusion,
which is that the "legal worldview and the language that expresses
it are imparted ... in large part through reorienting the way stu-
173 See generally Suzanne J. Schmitz & Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Reinvigorating the 11 Curricu-
lum: Sequenced "Writing Across the Curriculum" Assignments As the Foundation for Producing
Practice-Ready Law Graduates, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 287, 292 (2012) (observing that "mastery of
research, writing, and other skills listed above suffers when those skills are taught solely through
a standalone Legal Writing or Lawyering Skills course" and that such skills "can be better mas-
tered when reinforced in other settings, including doctrinal courses.").
174 See Florio & Hoffman, supra note 169, at 168 (observing that first-year law students are
most "intensely engaged" in legal education).
175 ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A
LAWYER" 4 (2007).
176 Id. at 12.
177 Id. at 4-6.
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dents approach written legal texts. This reorientation relies in im-
portant ways on a subtle shift in linguistic ideology."1 7 8 Because of
this linguistic reorientation, "[a] key function of law school is actu-
ally training to a common language that lawyers use to communi-
cate about the conflicts with which they must deal." 1 7 9 Whatever
collective bundle of meanings we attach to the phrase "thinking
like a lawyer" when we use it to describe the change in mental
processes that occurs during the first year of law school, those
changes are occurring through language.
Initially, this thought transformation occurs through "a dis-
tinctive approach to reading written legal texts [that] is inculcated
in law school classrooms."180 Mertz, however, found the next es-
sential ingredient in the classroom to the shift toward learning to
talk like a lawyer,s18 in which development of the student into a
"legal person" arises from discussion and role-play in the class-
room.1 82 The linguistic analytical framework of the Mertz study
suggests that the first year of law school has a tremendous impact
on how law students of varying backgrounds ultimately come to
see themselves socially, culturally, and morally in their roles as
lawyers.'8 3
These insights into the impact of language in the law school
classroom have large-scale implications,1 84 but here I wish to sug-
gest a comparatively smaller one: law students will tend to see their
developing professional selves largely as actors in a stare decisis-
oriented and judicial-centric world of law practice. That, after all is
substantially all that is ever presented to them, especially during
that engaging first year of law school. If, as Mertz quite reasonably
finds, thinking like a lawyer derives from both reading like a law-
yer and talking like a lawyer, then the potential places where we
can shift the developmental conversation of law students are in as-
178 Id. at 4-5.
179 MERTZ, supra note 175, at 5.
180 Id. at 97.
181 Id. at 130.
182 Id.
183 See generally id. 207-23
184 See, e.g., John M. Conley, Can You Talk Like A Lawyer and Still Think Like A Human
Being? Mertz's The Language of Law School, 34 LAw & Soc. INouRY 983, 1011-12 (2009) ("For
linguists, Mertz's work shows precisely how the linguistic practices and linguistic ideologies of
first-year law students are transformed. For legal scholars, the research yields a deeper under-
standing of what common law reasoning really means. It is not simply arguing from precedent,
but it is a highly specific set of practices for the manipulation of texts. For all those interested in
power, Mertz's work reveals the specific mechanisms whereby the patterns of thought that domi-
nate the law perpetuate their dominance.").
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signed texts, classroom speech, or both. In this section, I advocate
changing part of the classroom discussion away from the judicial
paradigm. In the next section, dealing with writing assignments, I
will consider texts.
In teaching legal analysis, whether through skills courses or
doctrinal courses, we are frequently dependent on the judicial par-
adigm to such an extent that many of us would find it difficult to
conduct class without it. If you do not believe that statement, try
playing your own personal version of the party game Taboo1 85 in
an upcoming class. Try to avoid, for one regular class period, use
of any of the following words or phrases associated with judicial
decisionmaking:
* court
* judge
* jury
* lawsuit
* plaintiff
* defendant
* precedent
* binding
* controlling
* persuasive
* majority rule
* holding
While this task is not impossible, it is surprisingly difficult.
Now, I do not suggest that there is any inherent virtue in
avoiding "court language" of the sort listed above as a matter of
course. These words are necessary and useful for law training. We
do, however, need to recognize and account for the growing num-
ber of legal practice situations in which students will find them-
selves where few or none of these terms will apply. In that light,
we cannot justifiably ignore the pervasive extent of our depen-
dence of such language and the impact it has on first-year law stu-
dents. If our classrooms cannot, at least on a few limited occasions,
185 Taboo is a word-guessing party game first published by Hasbro in 1989. The principal
challenge is to elicit a certain word from your teammates within a limited time while not using
any of the prohibited words or phrases on the Taboo card for that word. For example, a player
drawing a card with the word "lemon" at the top might be prohibited from using the words
yellow, sour, citrus, fruit, and tea in soliciting a response. See generally TABOO, (May 17, 2013)
http://www.hasbro.com/common/instruct/Taboo(2000).PDF (containing instructions for the game
that were published in 2000).
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consider the existence of legal reasoning apart from the doctrine of
stare decisis,186 then small wonder that students would have trouble
seeing themselves in situations where precedent is not inherently
controlling.'"' It behooves us to change the classroom discourse by
occasionally blocking stare decisis from classroom speech, espe-
cially on the professor's side.
3. Change the Assignments
The most labor-intensive change, but one that stands to be the
most fruitful in outcome, is to modify student writing and analysis
assignments to incorporate non-judicial decision-making. As law
schools that emphasize "writing across the curriculum, "188 some of
the suggestions described in this section could, in theory, occur in
any first-year course. The practical reality of most law schools' re-
quired course of study, however, is that the greatest opportunity
for assignment modification is in the first-year Legal Writing
course. Not only does it have the largest number of tangible writ-
ing assignments with which to work, but it also is the class in which
students are confronted with stare decisis in its strongest and most
confining form.
Objective problems designed around the assumption of actual
judicial decision-making certainly require the classic skill of analo-
gizing and distinguishing primary legal authority. Persuasive
problems set in a trial or appellate courtroom most obviously do as
well because the problems are, at their inception, an exercise in
persuading judges. And, as previously noted, this anchoring of the
students' reasoning through stare decisis is quite desirable. The
present goal is to retain that training but provide a sufficient coun-
terbalance to prevent it from being misleading.
That goal brings us to statutory interpretation, which I suggest
to be a replacement constraint in the absence of stare decisis. Re-
186 Accord William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Teaching Legislation: A Conversation, Articles,
Comments, and Speeches, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 49 (2004) ("[I1f students them-
selves start with the statute rather than with the judicial opinion, almost every one of them will
be engaged, at both the practical and theoretical levels, with the unique features of statutory
interpretation.").
187 See Douglas R. Haddock, Collaborative Examinations: A Way to Help Students Learn, 54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 550 (2004) (observing that "impressionable first-year students" tend to
believe that "answers are generally found only in judicial opinions and that the interpretation of
statutes is not a task for lawyers and law students.").
188 Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-Across-the-Law-School Curriculum:
Theoretical Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORs 73,
100-06 (2004) (describing and advocating elements of a write-across-the-curriculum program).
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gardless of whether students have a Legislation course somewhere
in their first-year curriculum, most of them will, perhaps in criminal
law, have had a brush with the "canons of statutory construction"
and interpretive methodology. Even with varying student experi-
ence levels, statutory text can serve a similar anchoring function for
students' legal reasoning once they are freed from the constraints
of stare decisis. Karl Llewellyn, for example, famously showed op-
posing canons of statutory construction pointing to opposite out-
comes on the same legal question. 1 8 9  The zone within which
students can craft predictive analysis or persuasive arguments is
quite large and can go multiple directions, more than under con-
straints of mandatory precedent. The skill they must apply is that
of justification of an outcome under lesser constraints. Still, stu-
dents must use some justification that can be tied to statutory text
and interpretive rules that exist apart from precedent. This skill is
that of "thinking like a judge," or more specifically, a judge who is
dealing with a question of first impression. Llewellyn held up the
opinion-crafting of Judge Benjamin Cardozo as an example of this
sort of outcome justification,190 and the analogy is an apt one for
our students.
Statutory interpretation is already a robust field with re-
sources that our students can and should be able to use, such as its
interpretive canons and abundant scholarship. 191 The moderate
amount of order imposed by tools of statutory interpretation lets
students think creatively, invoke considerations of policy, and yet
avoid the tempting-but-erroneous perception that all arguments
are created equal. Legal analysis must still have support, and that
support must be legal in nature. That which qualifies as "legal" can
vary anywhere from technical rules of parsing text, to use of legis-
lative history, and to the invocation of social policy-even (and
189 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
190 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 7 J. App. PRAC. & PROCEss 173, 186
(2005) (reprinted from 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627 (1962)) ("You must remember that Cardozo was a
truly great advocate, and the fact that he became a great judge didn't at all change the fact that
he was a great advocate.").
191 Cf Carlos E. Gonzalez, The 2006 David J. Stouffer Lecture: Statutory Interpretation:
Looking Back. Looking Forward, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 703, 708 (2006) ("The last 25 years has
been a particularly active period for statutory interpretation scholarship."); Gregory Scott
Crespi, Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU
L. REV. 9, 11 (2000) ("[T]here has been a very significant recent expansion in scholarship in this
area; at least 132 articles were published over the past decade alone that address statutory inter-
pretation issues at a broad, theoretical level.").
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perhaps especially) policy positions that might previously have lost
in court.
Thus, an assignment change of the sort contemplated here
must satisfy the dual goals of: (1) giving students experience work-
ing outside the stare decisis framework, and (2) implementing con-
straints that require use of statutory interpretation skills. I do not
pretend or attempt to offer a full-fledged "idea bank" of problems
here, as I suspect such an endeavor would be well beyond the abil-
ity of any single law teacher, and too much specificity might even
poison the well by establishing preconceived notions of what such
problems could and should be. The most important point is to
identify possible escape routes from the stare decisis-centric first
year where even statutory analysis is a subdivision of Langdell's
case method.
The possibilities for problem design may not be endless, but
they are substantial. On the administrative law side, for example,
find an agency enabling statute that has already been found ambig-
uous by an appellate court. Provide your students a set of interpre-
tive regulations, but assign them the task of developing alternative
regulations that would still be permissible interpretations of the
statute. This exercise could work particularly well as group
projects, where sets of students represent clients with widely vary-
ing interests, with an industry organization at odds with a public
interest group (a situation akin to the original Chevron case de-
scribed above),19 2 or even competing groups within a single indus-
try (rather like the situation in Brand X described above).'9 3
In the area of contractual arbitration, find a section of a uni-
form act, perhaps even the ubiquitous Uniform Commercial Code,
where states have interpreted identical textual provisions differ-
ently. 194 Place the problem in a jurisdiction that follows the ap-
proach that is worse for your client and requires the students to
marshal arguments for why an arbitrator ought to follow another
jurisdiction's interpretation. Or present the same problem at an
earlier stage: one party has brought a breach-of-contract lawsuit
and your client must decide whether to waive its right to arbi-
192 See supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 65-86.
194 See, e.g., 1 UCC TRANSACTION GUIDE § 2:4 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 2012) (describ-
ing and collecting cases on the divergent "predominant purpose" and "gravamen" tests followed
in various UCC jurisdictions for determining whether Article 2 applies to a mixed transaction in
both goods and services.).
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trate1 95 or to seek to compel arbitration. 19 6  The students' goal
would be to identify the statutory arguments that could be availa-
ble in arbitration; or alternatively, to identify certain constructions
of a statute that would be preclusive in court, but could be argued
around in arbitration.
Lest anyone think these sorts of assignments involve mere
"getting around the law" and promote a jaded view by the general
public of the lawyer's task,1 97 understand that these situations ulti-
mately are just another place for the analysis and advocacy skills
we already hope to impart to our students. If anything, a better
understanding of legal mechanisms outside of stare decisis opens
up possibilities for seeking justice where the usual system may have
none to offer. Just as the courts of equity developed to provide
redress that was unavailable from the courts of law,198 use of train-
ing in legal systems beyond the reach of stare decisis provides an-
other possibility for greater equity. The builder has tools but also
has the ultimate responsibility to use them properly; the possibility
of misuse is no excuse to pretend that the tools do not exist. If
possible to do so-and it is-we owe it to our students to enable
them to deal with the legal system as it actually is, and not as Lang-
dell or anyone else has idealized it.
The three steps for implementation of a downsized stare deci-
sis with an upsized reliance on statutory interpretation are more
195 See, e.g., Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (observing that
waiver of a contractual right to arbitrate occur when a party substantially invokes the litigation
machinery prior to demanding arbitration and has thereby prejudiced the other party); In re
Pharmacy Ben. Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that waiver of
an arbitration will normally be found only where the demand for arbitration came long after the
suit commenced and when both parties had engaged in extensive discovery); Wheeling Hosp.,
Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., 683 F.3d 577, 586 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing
the rule as a "default" of a party's right to arbitration when it so substantially utilizes the litiga-
tion machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the
stay.).
196 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (authorizing courts to "make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration" in accordance with the terms of their agreement to arbitrate.).
197 James L. Gibson, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 593, 603 (2007) (reporting results of a 2005 survey showing approval for "getting around
the law" as a minority position among the American public.).
198 See H. Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of Equity, 45
MERCER L. REV. 919, 998 (1994) ("The growing inadequacy of the equitable relief which could
be obtained from the common law courts drove litigants into the Chancery; and when Chancery,
acting on different principles and with a different procedure, took over the administration of
equitable relief, the equity formerly administered by the common law courts completely de-
cayed." (quoting 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 344-45 (1903)).).
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incremental than revolutionary. But my hope is that they are a
step in the right direction.
V. CONCLUSION: ARE OUR STUDENTS READY
TO PLAY JUDGE YET?
Solomon is attributed with the observation that "[o]f making
many books there is no end." 199 That insight from three thousand
years ago might well be said of law school curricular criticism and
reform movements today. The Carnegie Foundation for the Ad-
vancement of Teaching saw fit to issue comprehensive critiques of
legal education in both 1914200 and 2007,201 and there was certainly
no shortage of other prominent criticism both in the interim202 and
since the latter report.2 0 3 And one suspects a savvy bookmaker
would place much higher odds on the likelihood eighty years from
now of observing heated debate over the content and methods of
legal education instead of observing resolution.2 0 4
This article's goals, accordingly, have been modest. The first
goal is to draw attention to a problem-the increased inconsistency
between American legal education and American law practice on
one foundational organizing principle of the first year of law
school, stare decisis. Administrative law and arbitration are two ar-
eas where the practical decline of stare decisis has been most pro-
nounced over the past decade. A second goal is to show that this
particular dissonance between education and practice is not sus-
ceptible to a sweeping solution, certainly none that involves sweep-
ing away the role of precedent in our first-year instruction. While
199 Ecclesiastes 12:12.
200 JOSEPH REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOLS (1914).
201 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFES-
SION OF LAW (2007).
202 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (complaining prominently that law schools "are
moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle
ground-ethical practice-has been deserted by both.").
203 See, e.g., Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 356 (2012)
("This [2012] essay challenges Carnegie's [2007] conclusion that law school successfully teaches
students to think like lawyers.").
204 Accord A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949, 1956 (2012) (noting that "over the past 130 years we have heard
from many sources that law schools are not truly fulfilling their obligation to prepare students
for legal practice.").
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stare decisis has long been recognized as far from an absolute truth
in actual judicial habit, it has retained a role as a brooding shadow
over legal reasoning.
Finally, having described the problem of diminished stare deci-
sis in American legal practice while the doctrine remains critical to
a hallmark success of American legal education, this article pro-
poses some steps for improving the situation. Once we recognize
the problem and its potential detrimental impact on our students,
the corrective steps we can take now begin with intentionally dis-
cussing it rather than ignoring it. Hopefully, we can change some
(but not all or even most) of our students' tangible legal analysis
assignments, particularly in our first-year Legal Writing courses,
such that they eliminate the primacy of analysis based on control-
ling precedent. In the absence of stare decisis, stepped-up use of
statutory interpretation skills can serve as the substitute anchor
that allows greater analytical freedom but not unlimited drift.
In the end, students leaving their first year of law school
should have a more accurate base of knowledge from which to ap-
ply their skills and more ably serve their future clients. This peda-
gogical goal is a worthy one because, after all, the need for skilled
service to clients is the reason we have any students to teach in the
first place. Are law students ready to think like a high court judge
in a decidedly non-judicial age? Perhaps not, but we can do more
to improve their chances of being ready.
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